Wednesday, January 03, 2007
How to Win in Iraq
I don't have an ounce of faith in John McCain, but his old article on the subject http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A14254-2003Nov7?language=printer
seems to be a legitimate starting point. He makes some good points but falls short on the details of his plan to commit at least another division. He does seem to favor a search and destroy campaign against the insurgents.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html In this article from 2005, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., suggests "an "oil-spot strategy" in Iraq, ... Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need. Since the U.S. and Iraqi armies cannot guarantee security to all of Iraq simultaneously, they should start by focusing on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort -- hence the image of an expanding oil spot. Such a strategy would have a good chance of success. But it would require a protracted commitment of U.S. resources, a willingness to risk more casualties in the short term, and an enduring U.S. presence in Iraq, albeit at far lower force levels than are engaged at present. If U.S. policymakers and the American public are unwilling to make such a commitment, they should be prepared to scale down their goals in Iraq significantly."
Krepinevich proposes this "hearts and minds" strategy to win the American people, the Iraqi people and the American soldier -- as opposed to a campaign to hunt insurgents. He admits that this strategy takes a great deal of time. Each "spot" would still require an anti-insurgent campaign followed by fortification and training of the Iraqi's within the area to increase security so reconstruction could begin. Krepinevich maintains that this strategy could be effectively carried out with fewer troops than the 140,000 in Iraq at the time he wrote the article.
The other pillar of Krepinevich's strategy is the Grand Bargain - a coalition of Iraqi interest groups. "The grand bargain would cut across key Iraqi religious and ethnic groups and across key tribal and familial units. Its underlying assumptions would be that there are significant elements of each major ethnic and religious group willing to support a democratic, unified Iraq; that a sufficiently broad coalition can be formed, over time, to achieve this end; and that the United States is willing to undertake a long-term effort, lasting a decade or longer, to ensure the grand bargain's success. " With the success of the grand bargain, U.S. troops could be scaled back to 60,000 or less.
I don't know if this piece on "Why Military Occupations Fail" gives any strategy for winning in Iraq, but it looks interesting. http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec_29_1_49_0.pdf I'll have to read and summarize it in another post.
There is also a stick figure presentation out there (see ABC news for it) that makes some simple points -- but I think it is too simplistic. I think Krepinevich's suggestion includes and goes beyond stick figures concepts.
This piece http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/how-to-winlose-the-war-in-iraq.htm advocates replacing the soldiers with a paramilitary police force.
This blog entry by Juan Cole http://www.juancole.com/2005/08/ten-things-congress-could-demand-from.html lays out a 10 step plan -- the first two steps are to withdraw nearly all of the ground troops. The remaining steps propose helping the Iraqi's with air power, weapons, and training. -- Really nothing more than a glorified cut and run proposal.
This August 2005 piece by Gen. Wesley Clark is long on criticism and short, in that old familiar way, on specifics for winning http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/25/AR2005082501623.html. It concludes with the cut and run solution.
This piece by Fred Gedrich and Paul E. Vallely http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20061227-092444-4051r.htm advocates putting the special forces in charge and letting the conventional military play a back up role.
More to come
