Friday, July 15, 2005
Federalist No. 76, part 1
I know I haven't even finished posting on Federalist No. 1. But at the rate I'm going (comparable to the ground speed of hogtied sloth in a gunny sack full of rocks) I won't finish before the Apocalypse. Therefore, I leap forward like Wyle E. Coyote on steel springs and rocket boosters (with perhaps not dissimilar results) to excepts from Federalist No. 76. This paper is credited to Hamilton which deals with the presidential power of appointment, very a propos in light of O'Connor's resignation and Rhenquist's health:
The President is "to nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States..."
So when we have the O'Connor replacement confirmation hearings, let the members of the Senate offer their advice (to be taken or ignored) and have an up or down vote. It is the president who "nominates" and "appoints" not the Senate.
It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration." If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union; and it will not need proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character of its administration.
The endless fillibuster blackmail the Dems promise threatens the judicious plan the founders have foreseen for good government.
... I proceed to lay down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps of superior discernment.
Hamilton has forseen the modern day Senate, or at least its perception of itself and said, in effect, 'Senators don't make the appointment, that is best left to President.' Because:
... He will have fewer personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. ( This is exactly the kind of conduct that Mark Levin in Men In Black has said is happening -- The Democrats are catering to left wing extremists, thus being warped and distracted. ) There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations, whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly.
more later
The President is "to nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States..."
So when we have the O'Connor replacement confirmation hearings, let the members of the Senate offer their advice (to be taken or ignored) and have an up or down vote. It is the president who "nominates" and "appoints" not the Senate.
It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration." If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union; and it will not need proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character of its administration.
The endless fillibuster blackmail the Dems promise threatens the judicious plan the founders have foreseen for good government.
... I proceed to lay down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps of superior discernment.
Hamilton has forseen the modern day Senate, or at least its perception of itself and said, in effect, 'Senators don't make the appointment, that is best left to President.' Because:
... He will have fewer personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. ( This is exactly the kind of conduct that Mark Levin in Men In Black has said is happening -- The Democrats are catering to left wing extremists, thus being warped and distracted. ) There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations, whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly.
more later
// posted by Zerin Hood @ 10:11 AM 
