Tuesday, May 03, 2005
Men In Black II
More material from Levin's excellent book.
In my last post I mentioned that the foreign nations to whom some justices of the SCOTUS have shown a proclivity to turn for guidance are not federal systems. Today I came across an apt passage in Levin's book in which he quotes Steven Calabresi, law professor at Northwest University School of Law:
"There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prospertiy, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb more completely the attention of the U.S. Court." p. 132.
My experience has been that detractors of federalism are prone to argue that the federal system makes for the "balkanization" of rights -- as if it is somehow immoral to have different standards, practices or laws from state to state. I think that is what is part of what makes America great. If I don't like the laws in one state, I can move to another where the things I find important are granted more favorable treatment under the law. Why should a small western desert town be governed by the same rules and regulations as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles? What is the point of having 50 different state constitutions if the 9 lawyers in robes are going to decree that they all must mean the same thing, or are meaningless because of national standards? It violates the very foundation of the Constitution.
Levin follows Calabresi's quote with the same point one of my law professor's liked to make: "Unfortunately federalism has absorbed the attention of the Supreme Court only to the extent of overruling it." p. 132.
Levin states that because the SCOTUS has given such expansive meaning to the commerce clause, "government has become increasingly centralized, and the economy is lurching toward socialism." p. 131.
He says that the cost of compliance with regulatory burdens in the United States exceeds the economic output of many nations, including Canada and Mexico. p. 140.
I can still remember my outrage at the Wickard case in Conlaw. That first semester, it seemed like the Constitution was nothing more than the commerce clause and the national bootheel in the face of states and localities.
In my last post I mentioned that the foreign nations to whom some justices of the SCOTUS have shown a proclivity to turn for guidance are not federal systems. Today I came across an apt passage in Levin's book in which he quotes Steven Calabresi, law professor at Northwest University School of Law:
"There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prospertiy, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb more completely the attention of the U.S. Court." p. 132.
My experience has been that detractors of federalism are prone to argue that the federal system makes for the "balkanization" of rights -- as if it is somehow immoral to have different standards, practices or laws from state to state. I think that is what is part of what makes America great. If I don't like the laws in one state, I can move to another where the things I find important are granted more favorable treatment under the law. Why should a small western desert town be governed by the same rules and regulations as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles? What is the point of having 50 different state constitutions if the 9 lawyers in robes are going to decree that they all must mean the same thing, or are meaningless because of national standards? It violates the very foundation of the Constitution.
Levin follows Calabresi's quote with the same point one of my law professor's liked to make: "Unfortunately federalism has absorbed the attention of the Supreme Court only to the extent of overruling it." p. 132.
Levin states that because the SCOTUS has given such expansive meaning to the commerce clause, "government has become increasingly centralized, and the economy is lurching toward socialism." p. 131.
He says that the cost of compliance with regulatory burdens in the United States exceeds the economic output of many nations, including Canada and Mexico. p. 140.
I can still remember my outrage at the Wickard case in Conlaw. That first semester, it seemed like the Constitution was nothing more than the commerce clause and the national bootheel in the face of states and localities.